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ARGUMENT
I.

The settlors clearly intended to prohibit each other from
cutting the other1s children out of the picture.
Defendants do not dispute that interpretation of the

Declaration of Trust at issue in this case requires a
determination of the settlors1 intent, see

Makoff

v. Makoff,

528

P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974), or that
[i]n ascertaining the intention of the settlor[s] [this
Court] may consider the entire instrument aided by the
surrounding circumstances existing at the time of creation
of the trust.
Id.

(emphasis added).

Nevertheless, in part IIC of their

Argument, defendants contend that the limitation in the
Declaration of Trust that "[i]f one of the above listed should be
deceased, the beneficiaries cannot be changed" (R.7) applies only
to the surviving settlor and not to the surviving trustee.
According to defendants,
[plaintiffs1] argument that the trust addendum which
provides that following the death of one of the co-settlors
that the beneficiaries cannot be changed has no bearing on
whether a sole surviving trustee can convey realty and
thereby terminate the trust with respect to that realty; the
sale of trust property is a power exercisable only by a
trustee while the naming of beneficiaries is a right solely
exercisable by a settlor.^
While this argument may have some academic appeal, it
requires either that the settlors' intention be completely
ignored or a determination that the settlors1 intention was
absurd.

Under the Declaration of Trust, Joseph and Rhoda Thurber

each wore two separate hats: that of a settlor and that of a

x

Reply [sic] Brief of Appellees at 9-10.
1

trustee.

Acceptance of defendants' interpretation of the

language of the addendum would require a determination that
Joseph f s and Rhodaf s intent was not to prevent each other from
depriving the other's children of their beneficial interests in
the trust, but, rather, that if one of them did decide to deprive
the other's children of their beneficial interests, he or she
would be required to do so not with his or her surviving
settlor's hat on, but with his or her surviving trustee's hat on.
Picture Joseph and Rhoda sitting around the fire one cold winter
evening long ago quietly discussing the terms of the trust which
they were contemplating establishing for their beloved children.
Joseph says to Rhoda, "Rhoda, after I die, if you decide that you
don't want my daughter to receive any of our property, that's
okay; I don't mind.

But, I don't want you to do it by changing

the beneficiaries of our trust.

I want you to put on your

surviving trustee's hat, sell all of our property and give all
the proceeds to your kids."

And Rhoda responds, "Okay dear, that

sounds a little peculiar to me, but whatever you say."
That, of course, is not what happened.

Defendants have

never disputed, and the trial court specifically determined, that
Joseph and Rhoda "wanted to set up a trust that would not be
changed after one [of them] died." (R.127, pp.20-21).

It would

certainly not have mattered to Joseph and Rhoda whether it was
the surviving settlor's powers or those of the surviving trustee
that were used to do the changing.

They did not want the

survivor to be able to change the trust, period.
2

In short, acceptance of defendants1 contention that the
Declaration of Trust's limitation on the changing of
beneficiaries applies only to the settlors1 powers and not to
those of the surviving trustee would require that Joseph's and
Rhoda's intent be ignored and should be rejected.
II.

Defendants misread West,
In part III of their Argument, defendants assert that the

West2

"Court found that Herschel West was the sole active

beneficiary of the trust, and as such, Herschel West could
terminate the trust as a trustee without violating any fiduciary
duty to a named beneficiary."3
The precise ruling in West

That is clearly not the case.

is as follows:

...we conclude that Herschel West, Sr., as sole trustee,
could sell or dispose of the property as he saw fit. This
involved no breach of his fiduciary duty since he was at
that point the sole beneficiary.
948 P.2d at 356 (emphasis added).
The determinative factor was that Herschel was the "sole
beneficiary," not, as defendants contend, that he was the sole
"active" beneficiary.

The West

court's ruling that Herschel was

the sole beneficiary was based upon its determination that "[t]he
trust instrument is clear that the children do not become
^Matter

of

Estate

of West,

948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997).

^Reply Brief of Appellees at 12 (emphasis added).
4

The Court did, of course, also characterize Herschel West
as an "active" beneficiary. 948 P. 2d at 3 55. However, its
discussion in that regard was simply to establish that he was in
fact a beneficiary at all in light of the fact that "the trust
instrument does not specifically name [him and his first wife] as
beneficiaries."
Id.
3

beneficiaries until the ^death of the survivor1 of the two
settlors."

948 P.2d at 355 (emphasis added).

As discussed in

Appellants1 Opening Brief, however, the language of the
Declaration of Trust at issue in the case at bar is
determinatively different from the language of the trust
instrument at issue in West.
issue in West,

Unlike the trust instrument at

there is no provision that plaintiffs were not to

become beneficiaries until the "death of the survivor" of the two
settlors.

To the contrary, the language of Joseph and Rhoda

Thurbers1 Declaration of Trust is very clear that plaintiff's
became beneficiaries on the date of its execution, April 1, 1980.
Defendants attempt to minimize this distinction by
characterizing it as having "two serious flaws: one textual and
one rational."

Explaining the so-called "textual flaw,"

defendants direct the court's attention to language found not in
the part of the Declaration of Trust which identifies the
beneficiaries, as was the case in West,

but in the following

sentence which addresses termination of the trust:
Upon the death of the survivor
of us, unless all the
beneficiaries shall predecease us or unless we shall die as
a result of a common accident or disaster, our Successor
Trustee is hereby directed forthwith to transfer said
property and all right, title and interest in and to said
property unto the beneficiaries absolutely and thereby
terminate this trust...
(R.6)(emphasis added).
In short, while the words "death of the survivor of us" do
appear in the Declaration of Trust at issue in this case, they
5

Reply Brief of Appellees at 12.
A

appear in a completely different context than they do in
and, unlike the situation in West,

West

they have nothing to do with

establishing the date upon which plaintiffs became beneficiaries.
In support of what they refer to as the "rational flaw/'
defendants contend that plaintiffs "have ignored the
analysis entirely."^

West

According to defendants, because Rhoda

retained the right to receive income and manage the trust
property for her own benefit the possibility existed that Rhoda
could have completely exhausted the trust corpus without ever
having to resort to her power to revoke the trust.

Apparently,

what defendants are suggesting is that plaintiffs would have been
no better off if Rhoda had simply used all of the trust res for
her own benefit, rather than transferring it to defendants.
That may or may not be the case.
happened.

However, that is not what

What happened is that Rhoda did exactly what she and

Joseph agreed not to do: deprive each others1 children of their
beneficial interests in the trust after one of them died.
Distilled to its essence, defendants1 position is that

West

stands for the proposition that any time you have a revocable
trust "designed primarily to avoid the entanglements often
associated with the probate process [and the settlors/trustees]
reserve[] and retain[] extensive and broad powers under the
trust, not only to revoke the trust itself, but to utilize the
trust corpus for their own benefit while they [are] still

~Reply Brief of Appellees at 15.
5

living,'" then under such circumstances the trustees owe no
fiduciary duty to the named beneficiaries.

The short answer to

this position is that if that is what the West

court had in mind,

it would have been very easy for it to have said so.

It did not.

As indicated above, what it did say was that when Herschel West
quit-claimed his home to himself and his second wife, "he was at
that point the sole beneficiary,"
trust.

of his and his first wife's

Accordingly, at that point there were no other

beneficiaries to whom a fiduciary duty might be owed.
cannot be said in the case at bar.

The same

Plaintiffs were clearly

present beneficiaries to whom Rhoda Thurber owed fiduciary
duties.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs respectfully request that
the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
defendants be reversed and that this case be remanded to the
trial court with instructions for the entry of summary judgment
in favor of plaintiffs with respect to their conversion claim.

a

DATED t h i s J_T

day of January, 2 000,

Scott B. Mltchel.
JVt£t>rney for P l a i n t i f f s
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948 P.2d at 356.
6

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Undersigne certifies that two copies of the foregoing were
mailed this J\
y of January, 2000, via first class U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Randall L. Skeen
5788 South 900 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 8

7

